[A]part from the District Court's finding that TRPA's actions represented a proportional response to a serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might have argued that the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
Complying with this criterion requires that restrictive regulations be designed to mitigate some demonstrable social costs that would otherwise be imposed by the unregulated use of the property in question. 9 Already in 1995 there existed a mass of uncontroverted empirical evidence demonstrating that rent control tends to have the opposite effect -creating social costs and burdens that would not otherwise exist, and exacerbating housing problems far beyond anything that would pertain in competitive markets. Rent-controlled cities in California and Massachusetts have suffered serious declines in their stock of rental housing, despite a housing boom in comparable but uncontrolled cities in those states. 10 Moreover, the incidence of these costs has been alarmingly regressive. It has long been understood that a disproportionate share of the financial benefits of rent control accrue to residents of the most well-to-do Other procedural hurdles have of course been raised by local governments in California to try to bar federal takings claimants from seeking relief in federal court. 36 In general, though, the relatively short statute of limitations is the determinative procedural issue for asserting federal jurisdiction over facial "substantial advancement" claims.
III THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF MOBILE HOME PARK RENT CONTROL
At a sufficient level of abstraction, the political economy of all rent control is the same. When government can be induced to set rents below market levels, an identifiable quantum of real wealth is shifted from the owners of the regulated property to their tenants. 37 If the per capita value of this wealth transfer exceeds the opportunity costs of lobbying, rational tenants will lobby for the adoption of rent control. 38 This is a commonplace example of the process Madison warned against as the employment of governmental power for the benefit of "factions": The first danger in any democracy is the most readily understood. Majorities use their power to take away resources and opportunities from minorities and redistribute it to themselves. 40 Rent control in mobile home parks, however, adds a powerful "kicker" not found in other varieties of rent regulation: once tenant-lobbyists have succeeded in imposing controls, they can immediately "cash out," capturing the full present value of below-market rents by selling their mobile home coach in place in a rent-controlled park.
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Mobile home park tenants normally own their own coaches, which sit on land (spaces commonly referred to as pads) owned by the mobile home park. Their housing costs are therefore the sum of mortgage payments on the coach, plus rent payments on the underlying land. Rent control obviously reduces the second component, but in addition, the assurance of below-market rents in the future is capitalized into the resale value of the coach. This "premium," or incremental resale value attributable to rent control, represents the present value of the future stream of financial benefits tenants will receive common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community"). 
V EARLY TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO MOBILE HOME PARK RENT CONTROL APPLIED LORETTO'S PHYSICAL OCCUPATION ANALYSIS
As is apparent from the foregoing empirical studies of the capitalization process, the magnitude of the aggregate wealth transfers that rent control can facilitate within a single mobile home park can be substantial. This, coupled with the effect of the Mobilehome Residency Law in depriving park owners of any meaningful control over who occupies their property, led the first wave of constitutional challenges to be modeled on the "permanent physical occupation" theory of [The Halls] argued that by giving tenants the right to a perpetual lease at a belowmarket rental rate, the ordinance transfers to each of them a possessory interest in the land on which their mobile home is located. According to the Halls, this interest has a market value and a market: the market for mobile homes located in mobile home parks. According to the Halls, the price of mobile homes in their park shot up dramatically after enactment of the ordinance, with many selling far above their blue book value. They claim that the substantial premium paid for mobile homes in parks subject to the Santa Barbara Ordinance reflects the transfer of a valuable property right to occupy mobile home parks at below-market rates. sit idly by and watch taxpayers' money and court time being expended in litigation over the effects of this decision.
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In this, Judge Schroeder proved to be half right. Hall indeed marked the opening skirmish in a protracted battle over the constitutionality of mobile home rent regulations that would continue into the next century. However, the Ninth Circuit would hardly "sit idly by" as an observer in this process.
VI YEE V. ESCONDIDO MARKED A TRANSITION FROM HALL'S PHYSICAL TAKINGS THEORY TO CLAIMS BASED ON FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS
The successful Hall litigation triggered a flurry of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of mobile home rent control in California. 84 88 503 U.S. at 527. 89 Id. at 530. 90 Id. This effect might have some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as it may shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to advance. control is a regulatory taking.
VIII WILL THE SUPREME COURT FINALLY DECIDE?
After denying petitions in a long series of rent control cases dating back to its Chevron may well set the direction for the 21 st century.
